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Let me begin where Professor Cox began. Professor Cox re-
counted: "It was on September 17, 1787, that stout, old Ben Frank-
lin's sedan chair was carried up the steps of Independence Hall for
the signing of a proposed new Constitution. Franklin wept as he
signed."'
But" instead of joining Ben Franklin and the other delegates in
the Pennsylvania State House, let's follow the "four husky prisoners
from the Walnut Street Jail"2 who carried the ailing Dr. Franklin.
The Jail was located directly across from the State House where the
Constitutional Convention met.
Our Jail tour is conducted by Charles Dickens (albeit fifty-five
years later), who in 1842 visited Philadelphia's Eastern Penitentiary,
the successor to the Walnut Street Jail. He described the character
of this Quaker experiment, which was intended to provoke self-im-
provement through introspection:
Over the head and face of every prisoner who comes into
this melancholy house, a black hood is drawn; and in this
dark shroud, an emblem of the curtain dropped between
him and the living world, he is led to the cell from which he
never again comes forth, until his whole term of imprison-
ment has expired. He never hears of wife or children;
home or friends; and life or death of any single creature.
He sees the prison-officers, but with that exception, he
never looks upon a human countenance, or hears a human
voice. He is a man buried alive; to be dug out in the slow
round of years; and in the meantime dead to everything but
torturing anxieties and horrible despair.3
If, as he walked to the State House each morning, James
Madison had looked behind the "long begging poles of reed, with
... cloth cap[s] at the end" 4 thrust out the Jail windows by the more
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A.,
Dartmouth College, 1966; J.D., Georgetown Law Center, 1969.
1. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: JudicialActivism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L.. REV.
118, 118 (1987).
2. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 34 (1966).
3. -C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES (P. Smith ed. 1961).
4. C. BOWEN, supra note 2, at 50.
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fortunate inmates, the ones on the open, debtors' side of the Jail, he
would have seen what Dickens later saw.
What if Madison had taken Dickens' Jail tour in 1791, the year
the eighth amendment, with its proscription of "cruel and unusual
punishments,' '5 was ratified as part of the Bill of Rights? Leaving
the "incorporation" question6 aside, would he have thought the Jail
conditions, themselves a recent reform, violated that new amend-
ment he had helped draft? If it were not the intention of the drafts-
men of the eighth amendment, or those who ratified it, to lift the
black hoods from the inmates' heads, or to allow them to visit with
family, should that intention bind the judicial conscience of today's
Supreme Court?
In my view, those who would freeze the meaning of the Consti-
tution in the specific understandings of 1787 and 1788 miniaturize
the founders; the text, history, and spirit of the Constitution; and
the judicial function itself.
Because, in this respect, I share Professor Cox's expanded vi-
sion of original intent, and because that vision supports much of the
Warren Court's work, I would like to look more closely at the histor-
ical justifications for this expanded vision. Yet it is the founders'
original intent about the Court's role-whether it ought to be active
or passive-that I specifically wish to discuss.7
Discovering this intent is a task that requires more than histori-
cal reconstruction. While the founders did speak about whether
they expected judges to review and invalidate laws that conflicted
with the Constitution, they said much less about whether judicial
review should be exercised "actively" or "passively." Thus, my
search is for clues-in history, the text and structure of the Consti-
tution, and the Convention and ratifying debates-about what they
might have said if asked.
My inquiry can be organized around some of the traditional jus-
tifications for judicial self-restraint. What did the founders think
about them? In analyzing these justifications, one inevitably relives
the great debates at the Constitutional Convention.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. The "incorporation question" involves whether the fourteenth amendment in-
corporated the Bill of Rights, making it applicable against the states. For a general dis-
cussion, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147, 158 (1968).
7. I agree with Professor Tushnet that the asserted "judicial activism" and "judicial
restraint" dichotomy may mean many different things. I accept the two phrases as de-
scriptive of often differing judicial views about the weight to be accorded the judgments
of legislative bodies, popular will, precedent, and governmental interests in interpreting
the Bill of Rights.
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Judicial activism, it is asserted, is antidemocratic; it erodes rep-
resentative self-government and majority rule. This may be the case
on some occasions. Judicial activism certainly did not have that ef-
fect in the apportionment cases. It has in the abortion cases.
Nonrepresentational compromises forged by Democrats and
aristocrats, however, animate virtually every essential provision of
the Constitution. Skepticism about unrestricted majoritarian rule
had many well-known sources: a desire to protect vested interests,
property, and commerce; fear, intensified by Shay's rebellion in
Massachusetts, that popular rule would threaten post-war stability;
respect for the English experience; and the general fear that the ma-
jority would oppress minorities. These concerns often were summa-
rized at the Convention as a general distrust of the "levelling spirit"
of the majority, but this distrust accompanied an expressed commit-
ment to at least partially representative democracy.
This modest schizophrenia was one of several factors that con-
tributed to the major constitutional compromises. The Senate was
created "to controul the more democratic branch of the Nat'l Legis-
lature."' Senators were given six-year terms and elected by state
legislatures to partially immunize them from transient, majoritarian
feelings. The electoral college was adopted as an intermediary be-
tween the people and their representatives. The President was
given a qualified veto power to control the excesses of the legislative
majority. More than a simple majority vote was required to amend
the Constitution. Most importantly, the potentially most an-
tidemocratic institution of all was created-the judiciary, with life-
time appointments.
The debates at the ratifying conventions highlighted the ten-
sions inherent in these great compromises. Brutus, a fierce New
York Anti-Federalist, predicted that the vagaries of constitutional
text would leave judicial interpretation of the Constitution without
limits, converting the judiciary into an autocracy. 9
Alexander Hamilton's famous defense of the judiciary as the
"least dangerous" branch of government-without the power of
purse or sword'°-was bolstered by a pragmatic observation: Con-
8. Comments of Edmund Randolph, delegate from Virginia, at the Constitutional
Convention (June 12, 1787), reprinted in J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 110 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
9. See Brutus, Essay No. XI, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 417-22 (H. Storing
ed. 1981).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 227 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981).
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gress could trim the Court's jurisdiction if it misbehaved." He
might have added many other restrictions to this list of institutional
disabilities.
Thus, judicial activism was an articulated issue of the times.
While the Constitution promises representative self-government
and majority rule, nonrepresentational judicial review-sometimes
in the form ofjudicial activism-was intended to diffuse governmen-
tal power and to prevent majoritarian oppression.
Let us turn to a second criticism. Judicial activism, it is as-
serted, denies state and local governments autonomy. Again, this is
true to some extent. But, put simply, the Articles of Confederation,
which promised a "league of friendship" 2 in which "each state re-
tain[ed] its sovereignty, freedom and independence,"' 3 yielded to a
nation. The patent need for a national government was grounded
in self-preservation. It was fueled by the failures of the Continental
Congress to support the troops at Valley Forge. And it generated
and controlled the Constitutional Convention.
This need to be a nation overcame profound regional differ-
ences, the intense small state-big state rivalry, and the volatile slav-
ery issue. The founders intended that the Supreme Court would
play a significant role in the assertion of national sovereignty, and
John Marshall soon made it clear how significant this role would be.
The loss of representative government at the local level-the
erosion of the states' role in federalism-is a real loss. But when the
conflicts are between local communities, on the one hand, and black
children who seek an integrated education, black adults who want
equal weight attached to their votes, and criminal defendants who
assert their right to counsel or their privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, on the other, the case for national rules of decision is very
strong.
Third, judicial activism, it is asserted, conflicts with the role of
precedent. Perhaps sometimes it does, as in the school integration
cases. But sometimes, it can be expressed as a refinement of the
common-law method, as in the evolution of the "clear and present
danger" test. "
I admit that the founders' experience with the common-law tra-
11. Id.
12. Articles of Confederation, art. 3 (U.S. 1777).
13. Id. at art. 2.
14. This was a test established by the Supreme Court to determine when speech
constituted a punishable advocacy of an illegal act. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 450-54 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1969).
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dition created the expectation, discussed at the ratifying conven-
tions, that the development of constitutional precedent would
properly constrain judicial review.1 5 But it was reasonable to expect
that the role of precedent would be more limited than it had been in
the common-law experience.
The new national government, in many ways, was remarkably
unique. Although the debates were full of references to the states'
constitutions, Parliament, the colonial experience, and even the
Greek city-states, the national government was not a replication of
any one of these, with accrued experiences that would channel judi-
cial interpretation. Indeed, that was the central fear of the Anti-
Federalists.
In addition, the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights were
broad, evolving, and rooted in natural law. Responding to the pub-
lic firestorm about the initial lack of a bill of rights in the Constitu-
tion, James Wilson said: "Enumerate all the rights of men? I am
sure that no gentleman in the late Convention would have at-
tempted such a thing."' 6 Dr. Benjamin Rush added that it would be
"absurd to frame a formal declaration that our natural rights are
acquired from ourselves."' 7 The ninth amendment's recognition of
rights not enumerated in the first eight amendments evidences this
natural law philosophy.
In short, the founders did not propose a bill of rights limited to
the "circumstances of the moment." The rights recognized in the
Bill of Rights had evolved from the Magna Carta (and before),
through the 1628 English Petition of Rights, the 1641 Massachu-
setts Body of Liberties, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, colonial
charters, state constitutions, and state bills of rights.
When the founders placed these rights in trust for future gener-
ations and appointed the Supreme Court trustee, they certainly did
not intend to freeze these rights in the forms of 1787. To think so is
to infer that they also intended to limit all future travel to carriages
and all future commerce to canals.
Let me return to the Walnut Street Jail, or its successor. Its
debtors have now been released. Isolation can be used, but only for
limited periods and purposes. Prisoners must be allowed to visit
with family and friends. They are entitled to adequate food, shelter,
and clothing; hygienic necessities; reasonable protection from phys-
15. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
16. C. BOWEN, supra note 2, at 245-46.
17. Id. at 247.
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ical assault; essential medical care; rudimentary legal help to assert
habeas corpus and civil rights claims; and a minimal amount of liv-
ing and recreational space.
Much of this inmate-specific "bill of rights" has been the conse-
quence of federal "judicial activism," which, in this context, has
been increasingly criticized and limited by the current Supreme
Court. These activist decisions have sometimes, perhaps often, re-
versed majoritarian judgments, limited the exercise of local sover-
eignty, and broken with precedent.
However, in my view, these decisions are in the tradition of the
founders. They have diffused and checked extraordinary concentra-
tions of executive and legislative power. As one court explained:
[T]he most striking aspect of prison, in terms of Four-
teenth Amendment litigation, is that prison is a complex of
physical arrangements and of measures, all wholly govern-
mental, all wholly performed by agents of government,
which determine the total existence of certain human be-
ings (except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevita-
bly there as well), from sundown to sundown, sleeping,
waking, speaking, silent, working, playing, viewing, eating,
voiding, reading, alone, with others.'"
In checking centralized governmental power, these decisions
have protected a very unpopular and disenfranchised minority from
oppression and neglect sanctioned by the majority's representatives,
sometimes purely for individual political gain. These decisions also
have opened up prisons and jails to public scrutiny, in many in-
stances for the first time.
Such institutional jurisprudence has tailored to today's circum-
stances principles that motivated the founders' prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments." This constellation of factors, in my
view, justifies judicial activism, particularly in light of the institu-
tional limitations that bind the judiciary.
If we had met with George Washington, Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, James Wilson, and even Luther Martin, after the
adoption of the eighth amendment, and asked them whether Con-
gress and the people specifically intended to close the Walnut Street
Jail when they proscribed "cruel and unusual punishments," I am
sure they would have said "no." If we asked them, however,
whether they generally anticipated that abuses other than the inflic-
18. Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d
1335 (7th Cir. 1973).
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tion of bodily pain or mutilation might someday be condemned by a
United States court as "cruel and unusual," I think they would have
affirmed that to be the legitimate business of future generations of
judges.
